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ABSTRACT
A computer system for implementing electronic markets on networks of personal com-
puters is described. The program allows a researcher or teacher to design market simula-
tions to meet a variety of goals, and records a complete set of market activities for analysis.
Illustrations of example markets are provided, and the classroom application of mnrket
simulations in teaching agricultural economics is discussed.
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Experimental economics has an established
position in the economics profession as a re-
search tool for studying market institutions
and for testing game theoretical hypotheses
(Smith 1989). These methods have gained ac-
ceptance in large part for their ability to con-
trol factors that are confounded in natural mar-
ket settings and thereby provide direct tests of
hypotheses. Furthermore, experimental eco-
nomics is being used increasingly in econom-
ics curricula for demonstrating economic prin-
ciples and providing students with experience
in making economic decisions (Wells).
There has been some use of experimental
approaches in agricultural economics (a partial
list of studies includes Buccola; Forster; For-
ster and Roberts; and Adam et al.). Growing
interest by the agricultural economics profes-
sion was evidenced at a symposium held at the
1988 annual meetings of the American Agri-
cultural Economics Association (Forster et al.)
and by the half-day learning workshop held
after the 1993 association meetings.
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For many economists, however, the costi
benefit ratio associated with experimental ap-
proaches may be unfavorable. In part, this re-
flects research methods in economics which
emphasize analysis of secondary and, to a
lesser extent, survey data. Econometrics texts,
for example, typically offer little discussion of
sampling and experimental design, Further-
more, textbooks, lab manuals, and other sup-
port materials for the use of experimental tech-
niques are not widely available. Finally, the
logistics of designing experiments with suffi-
cient complexity to answer interesting ques-
tions or demonstrate complex concepts maybe
daunting. Economists will not adopt experi-
mental techniques unless the cost/benefit ratio
becomes more favorable.
One way to favorably influence this ratio
is through the use of flexible computer pro-
grams. The Electronic Market Place (EMP)
was developed toward this end. EMP is a sys-
tem for implementing electronic double-auc-
tion markets for multiple goods on systems of
networked IBM-compatible personal comput-
ers. It allows an experimenter considerable
flexibility in designing markets and provides
a complete record of experimental sessions.
Such a program can both increase the po-152 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
tential benefits and reduce the costs of using
market simulations. On the benefits side, elec-
tronic markets permit more complexity than
do simulated markets employing open outcry
or similar transaction methods. For example,
it is difficult to set up face-to-face markets
with several goods traded simultaneously, or
markets where information access varies
across participants. It is also difficult to sim-
ulate spatially separated markets or markets
with different participants representing various
links in a marketing chain (e.g., producers,
processors, retailers, and consumers). These
simulations are easily implemented through an
electronic system such as EMP. Thus the va-
riety of concepts and the depth with which
they can be explored are increased through the
use of electronic market simulations.
On the cost-reduction side, electronic mar-
kets eliminate many of the record keeping
chores associated with experimental markets.
During experimental sessions, participants are
relieved of the task of computing net market
positions and profits and can thereby concen-
trate on trading strategies and opportunities.
Assistants are not needed to facilitate, monitor,
or record transactions. Furthermore, complete
records of bid, ask, and transaction prices and
quantities can be generated, and payments to
participants can be calculated automatically,
These are typically the data needed for hy-
pothesis testing and can be used with student
subjects to facilitate discussion and analysis.
This article begins with a brief discussion
of the experimental economics framework.
The main features of the EMP program are
then described. The program description in-
cludes the general characteristics of all EMP
markets as well as those characteristics that
are under the control of the experimenter, how
participants interact with the program, and the
nature of the output available to the experi-
menter and/or participants upon completion of
an experimental session. Descriptions of some
example markets are then provided, followed
by a discussion of the use of the experimental
framework in the classroom along with some
results of an example market classroom ses-
sion.
The Experimental Economics Framework
Experimental economics places human sub-
jects in a controlled market situation. The mar-
ket designer (either an experimenter or a
teacher) determines the nature of the incen-
tives provided to the participants and the in-
stitutional structure of the market, including
how transactions are conducted, over what
time period, and what information is avail-
able. 1
Although the goods traded provide no in-
herent utility, value is induced through the in-
centive structure [Smith (1976) provides a rig-
orous treatment]. For example, any participant
who prefers more to less and who is promised
$1 for each unit of an asset held would be
willing to pay up to $1 for each unit and
would be willing to sell each unit for any
amount over $1. Usually the goods are given
nondescriptive names such as “units” or
“widgets” to prevent prior beliefs from influ-
encing subjective valuations (Davis and Holt);
with preconceived ideas about the value of a
good, participants may not base their decisions
on market parameters provided by the exper-
imenter,
The basic approach can be illustrated with
a simple experiment, variations on which have
been used extensively in classroom settings
(Wells). Participants are provided with some
money and five units of a homogeneous good.
They also are promised a price at which the
good can be redeemed from the experimenter.
This price, which differs across participants,
forms the basis for the market supply and de-
mand schedules, with participants willing to
sell at prices higher than their redemption price
and to buy at prices below it. Participants trade
the good by making bids and offers or by ac-
cepting other participants’ bids and offers.
Extensive experience with such simple
markets has demonstrated that the competitive
outcome (prices and quantities sold) almost
1The term experimenter is used here to denote the
person conducting the simulation, whether it is done
to test hypotheses or for pedagogical purposes. Simi-
larly, persons participating in the simulations are re-
ferred to here as participants or subjects.Fackler and A4cNew: Experimental Markets Using EMP 153
certainly will result if the experiment is rep-
licated several times (Davis and Holt, p. 149).
The experiments, therefore, can be an effective
means of convincing students that economic
concepts have something useful to say about
how markets function.
In many cases, such an experiment is con-
ducted in a classroom, with pieces of paper
representing claims to assets. Trading can be
carried out in various ways, including letting
students mill around and conduct individual
negotiations which then can be reported and
recorded on the blackboard, or having students
shout out offers to sell and bids to buy, or
acceptances of offers and bids, thereby simu-
lating the pit environment of a futures market.
Indeed, such experiments provide students
with an appreciation for the differences among
alternative market institutions. It has been
found, for example, that competitive prices are
discovered more quickly and efficiently in the
pit environment than with face-to-face nego-
tiations (Davis and Holt, pp. 125–26).
In addition to the basic competitive double-
auction market, numerous other market insti-
tutions have been examined experimentally,
including single-sided auctions, oligopolistic
and monopolistic markets, futures markets,
and public goods markets. Furthermore, nu-
merous studies have tested specific hypotheses
from decision theory and game theory. Davis
and Holt, and Kagel and Roth are useful ref-
erences providing detailed discussion of the
range and results of studies using the experi-
mental economics paradigm.
The EMP System for Conducting
Experimental Sessions
The logistics of running experiments in a class-
room or research setting can be daunting. At a
minimum, one must provide an accounting sys-
tem so participants can keep track of trades; it
also may be necessary to check participants’
arithmetic, especially when payments are made.
Assistants may be needed to record prices,
monitor trades, and, if appropriate, act as auc-
tioneers. Davis and Holt (p. 55) suggest that an
instructor have four helpers to conduct even the
simplest of market sessions.
In many cases, it would be challenging to
run a session even with the help of assistants.
Situations in which participants play different
economic roles, where there are multiple
goods being traded, where some participants
are not allowed to trade certain goods, or
where information must be provided privately
can be difficult to arrange.
For instructional purposes it is useful, and
for research purposes essential, that the results
of a session be recorded for analysis. It is pref-
erable that these results be entered into a com-
puter, but this delays the analysis and adds to
the burden.
The use of a computerized system can re-
duce many of the burdens and allow for more
sophisticated markets to be implemented. The
EMP system was developed to make it easy
for an individual to design, run, and analyze
double-auction experimental trading markets.2
Among the characteristics that can be con-
trolled using EMP are the number and length
of trading periods; the number, names, and
types of assets; the production possibilities,
starting positions, and position limits on each
asset (including negative limits for short sell-
ing); redemption values and depreciation
schedules on inventory held across periods;
and access to markets and market information.
EMP allows double-auction markets for up
to 18 goods to be implemented on a system
of networked IBM-compatible personal com-
puters.3 Up to 99 participants can access the
2EMP also can be used to implement a variety of
other market institutions, including single-sided auc-
tions and posted-price markets.
3EMP makes no use of network-specific functions
and therefore should run on any network system using
DOS 3,3 or higher. It also has a stand-alone “practice”
mode, which utilizes a random-number generator to
simulate other traders’ activities. In this mode, it can
be run on a single IBM PC or clone using DOS 2.0 or
higher. The practice mode can be used for demonstra-
tion or to allow participants to practice on their own
time. The EMP system can be downloaded as a com-
pressed (ZIP) file from the Internet for noncommercial
purposes by accessing the following UN.:
http:llwww2.ncsu. edulncsulcaWag_reclempl
and following the instructions. The compressed file
contains the executable programs and a number of
sample markets, as well as a detailed user’s manual.154 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
DAY I 1:32 TRADER 1 CASH: 1000.00
MARKET —ORDER TRADER
PORT- BIDS OFFERS ENTRY— BIDS
ASSET
OFFERS
FOLIO Q P Q P Q P Q P Q P
WIDGETS 10 10 32 13 35 10 32 5 40
WHATNOTS 20 5 26 25 30
Figure 1. Sample main screen
market during a session. Each computer serves
as a trading station from which participants
can buy, sell, and transform goods, and obtain
information on their own positions and on
market conditions.
Participant Zntetjace and Market Design
The program interface consists of a set of
screens: two activity screens, five information
screens, and context-sensitive help screens.
This section provides an overview of the main
interface features as well as a description of
other important market design features. Not all
of these features need be used in a particular
session or by all the participants of a session.
When EMP is used repeatedly by participants,
as in a classroom setting, the number of fea-
tures can be increased as participants gain fa-
miliarity with the system.
The Main Screen
The main trading screen is used to interact
with the market. Through this screen the par-
ticipant can bid to buy or offer to sell goods
and can accept market bids and offers. A sam-
ple screen, displayed in figure 1, represents a
market with two goods (called WZDGETS and
WHATNOTS ). The first line of the screen
shows that trading is 1 minute and 32 seconds
into the first trading period (day 1) and that
this screen is for Trader 1, who has $1,000 in
cash.
The remaining lines of the main screen
show the trader’s current portfolio in the two
goods (10 units of WIDGETS and 20 units of
WHATNOTS ) and the bids and offers on these
goods. The trader has no bids or offers for
WHATNOTS, but has bid $32 on 10 units of
WIDGETS and is offering five units at $40
(shown at the far right of the screen). The
screen also reveals the best bid and offer pric-
es (the market bid and offer are the highest
bid and lowest offer) and the quantities avail-
able at these prices. For example, 25 units of
WHATNOTS are being offered at a price of
$30,
EMP maintains an order queue of bids and
offers on each good, sorted first by price and
then by the time a bid or offer was made. For
the example in figure 1, Trader 1 has the best
outstanding bid on WIDGETS, whereas at least
one other trader has made a better offer. The
program does not automatically match trans-
actions; traders must accept an outstanding bid
or offer to complete a transaction. For exam-
ple, a bid of $40 on WIDGETS would not au-
tomatically result in a transaction (it would,
however, create arbitrage opportunities). When
a transaction is completed, the participating
traders’ portfolios and cash positions will au-
tomatically be adjusted. Thus if Trader 1 ac-
cepts two units of WHATNOTS offered at $30,
the screen would be altered to reflect a port-
folio position of 22 units and $940 in cash.
EMP has a number of features that allow
the designer to constrain market access of in-
dividual traders. For instance, a trader can be
prevented from making or accepting bids or
offers on particular goods. This allows the de-
signer to define different roles for the traders,
such as producer, wholesaler, and retailer. Pro-
ducers then may sell only to and retailers may
buy only from the wholesalers. Traders also
may be denied access to information on mar-
ket bids or offers, forcing them to submit bids
or offers without knowledge of other traders’
prices. In addition, upper and lower positionFackler and McNew: Experimental Markets Using EMP 155
DAY I 3.32 TRADER 1 CASH: 956.00
# of Runs: _ Remaining Capacity: 10 ENTER to process. ESC to exit.
PORT- PROCESS NUMBER
ASSET FOLIO 1 2
WIDGETS 1(I –1 –1
WHATNOTS 22 1 1
CASH 956.00 – 25 –50
Figure 2. Sample transformation screen
limits can be imposed. A lower limit of zero,
for instance, rules out short selling, whereas
an upper limit can simulate capacity con-
straints or government-imposed regulation.
The Transformation Screen
EMP also allows goods to be produced or
transformed. Experimenters can define up to
10 transformation processes through which,
for example, one or more goods can be used
to “produce” another good, or goods can be
converted to cash or cash to goods. In addi-
tion, capacity constraints can be imposed on
the transformation processes.
Participants can access this feature through
a second screen, an example of which is
shown in figure 2. This trader can select one
of two processes and the number of produc-
tion “runs” desired. Each run of the first pro-
cess will transform one WZDGET into one
WHATNOT at a cost of $25 in cash. The sec-
ond process is similar except that it requires
$50 in cash. In this case the second process is
dominated by the first, but capacity constraints
can be placed on each process. This facilitates
production with increasing costs, as once the
low-cost transformation is used, production
must occur through the next transformation at
a higher cost.
The Information Screens
A number of information screens are available
to traders, including summaries of purchases,
sales, and prices, and logs of all individual and
market transactions. The first information
screen is the trader’s summary screen. This
screen shows the daily starting and ending po-
sitions, the amounts purchased and sold during
the day, the average purchase and sales prices,
and any payments (adjustments) made at the
end of the day. The current and all previous
trading days can be accessed. Figure 3 dis-
plays an example summary screen for a trader
(denoted Trader 1) who consumes WHAT-
NOTS, for which the trader is paid according
to his/her WHATNOT payment schedule of
Q(5O – 0.5 Q), and incurs a cost for holding
WIDGETS of – 3Q (i.e., a negative payment
on WIDGET holdings). Trader 1 sold WZD-
GETS but had no transactions in WHATNOTS
on day 1 (note that the top line shows the cur-
rent period is day 2). The adjustments column
—
DAY 2 0:00 TRADER 1 CASH: 1671.00
TRADER SUMMARY FOR DAY 1
STARTING PURCHASES SALES ENDING ADJUST-
ASSET POSITION Q P Q P POSITION MENTS
WIDGETS 10 5 32,00 8 35.00 13 –39.00
WHATNOTS 20 — 20 800.00
CASH 1000,00 1881,00
—
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DAY 2 2:21 TRADER 1 CASH: 1671.00
MARKET SUMMARY FOR DAY 2
PRICES — SUPPLY —
ASSET HIGH LOW LAST AVERAGE VOLUME VALUE SHORT LONG
WIDGETS 45 32 45 36.33 3 I09 — 125
WHATNOTS 31 9 26 2286 7 160 25
Figure 4. Sample market summary screen
at the far right shows the values of the pay-
ments made at the end of day 1 (the negative
payment on WIDGETS of $39 can be inter-
preted as a storage charge of $3 per unit,
which we discuss further in the futures market
example below).
A second information screen displays sum-
mary information for the entire market. This
screen shows price information, transactions
volume (i.e., the number of units bought and
sold), the total transactions value (with aver-
age price equal to value/volume), and the total
short and long supply in the market. An ex-
ample is shown in figure 4. Traders also can
access two other screens that display transac-
tion logs—one for their own transactions and
one for the whole market. These allow the
trader to review the complete record of trans-
actions over the course of a trading session.
Payment and Depreciation Schedules
Value is induced on the goods through pay-
ments made to participants. These payments
occur at the end of each trading period and
depend on the amounts of the various goods
held by the participant. The payments may
represent actual cash amounts or they may
simply provide a score. In a classroom setting,
the score might be used to form the basis of
students’ grades.
Although the schedules are provided by the
experimenter, they can be thought of as the
intrinsic value placed on the goods by the par-
ticipants [see Smith (1976) for a discussion of
induced value theory]. Typically, participants
have no incentives guiding their behavior oth-
er than the payments they receive. There is,
therefore, a direct correspondence between the
size of the payments and the utility derived
from participation in the experiment.
An experimenter can create incentives for
trade by varying the payment schedules across
traders. Each schedule restates the quantity of
the good held by the participant at the end of
the trading period. The EMP system offers
several ways for an experimenter to specify a
payment schedule. The simplest of these is to
specify a schedule which has the form:
Payment = Q(a – bQ),
where a and b are parameters set by the ex-
perimenter, and Q is the quantity held at the
end of the trading day. This form of a payment
schedule depends on only two parameters and
covers a larger percentage of the schedules
used in experimental settings. The quadratic
payment schedule implies a linear marginal
value function (a – 2bQ), which in turn yields
an individual demand function of Q = a –
0.5bP, where P is the price at which the good
can be purchased.
More complex schedules can be imple-
mented in EMP through the use of an auxil-
iary program provided by the experimenter.
This program will be executed at the end of
each trading period and the resulting payments
credited to the participants’ accounts. The
EMP User’s Manual (refer to footnote 3) con-
tains detailed instructions on designing such a
program.
The designer can set the depreciation rate
on Q for instances of carryover from one day
to the next. For example, in a market with con-
sumers or end users, the depreciation rate
would be 100%, so that all holdings of a good
are redeemed at the end of the day and a pay-Fackler and McNew: Experimental Markets Using EklP 157
ment is issued based on the payment schedule.
A depreciation rate of zero would imply com-
plete carryover from one day to the next and,
if a storage charge is to be imposed, this could
be done by making a negative to reflect cost
of carry. The designer can change the a and b
parameters across trading days and vary them
across traders.
For many experiments, the complete sched-
ule is provided to participants. For example,
Davis and Holt (chapter 3) discuss a market
with buyers and sellers. Buyer 4 can purchase
up to two units, where the first can be re-
deemed for $4.60 and the second for $4.40.
This can be implemented by a redemption
schedule with a = 4.7 and b = 0.10. The mar-
ket also includes a seller who must pay $4.30
for the first unit sold and $4.40 for the second
unit. The associated redemption schedule,
therefore, uses a = –4.25 and b = 0.05.4 In
this market, buyers also would be constrained
to have between O and 2 units and sellers be-
tween – 2 and O.
Other Features of EMP
Markets
A significant feature of
economists is its ability
and Some Example
EMP for agricultural
to handle futures and
options contracts. Each traded asset can be
specified as a spot good, a future, a put, or a
call. Spot goods in EMP differ in two ways
from the other types. First, the buyer must pay
in full for the good at the time of the trans-
action, and second, end-of-day payment
schedules apply only to spot goods. Futures,
puts, and calls, on the other hand, all have a
maturity date and an underlying asset associ-
ated with them. At the end of the maturity
period, the selling trader (short) must deliver
the underlying asset to fulfill the contract,
which is credited to the account of the buying
trader (long). Alternatively, the contracts can
be cash-settled with no physical exchange of
the underlying asset, but rather a cash payment
based on the price of the underlying asset at
4Participants, of course, need not see these param-
eters. In this market, one would simply provide the
values of the first and second units.
the end of the maturity period. Furthermore,
futures, puts, and calls are marked-to-market,
meaning that payments are made only on the
capital gains or losses at the end of each trad-
ing period. These features enable experiment-
ers to provide more realistic simulations of
how futures and options markets work,
EMP creates a number of files that can be
used to analyze an experimental session. The
most important results are stored in files and
can be easily accessed and analyzed. For ex-
ample, the program creates a comma-delimite-
d ASCII file that contains a complete record
of bid, ask, and transaction prices. A file re-
cording the end-of-day asset and cash posi-
tions for each trader is also created. In addi-
tion, each of the information screens available
during trading sessions is written to output text
files for analysis by the participants or exper-
imenter. These files can be imported into a
spreadsheet or statistical package for review-
ing, analyzing, or graphing. To facilitate this
process, a LOTUS 1-2-3 file with macros is
available.
Several examples are presented below
which depict the kinds of markets that can be
easily implemented using EMP. In addition to
demonstrating how some of the program fea-
tures can be used, these examples illustrate
how to achieve certain pedagogical goals (as
discussed in the section that follows on using
experimental markets in the classroom). We
present only a small sample of the possible
markets which may be implemented using
EMI?
Vertical Market Relationships
The first example simulates a vertical market-
ing chain. There are two goods—RO UGH and
FZNZSHED. There are three groups of partic-
ipants—PROD UCERS, PROCESSORS, and
CONSUMERS. The PRODUCERS have the
ability to make units of RO UGH, and can buy
or sell ROUGH but cannot redeem ROUGH
and cannot deal in FINISHED at all. PRO-
CESSORS can buy ROUGH and sell FIN-
ISHED and can convert ROUGH into FIIV-
ZSHED; they cannot redeem either product,
however. CONSUMERS can buy, sell, and re-158 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Table 1. Sample Payment Schedules
Trader
Payment Schedule
Type Day 1 Day 2
1 –1OQ Q(1OO - 0.5Q)
2 –5Q Q(5O - 0.5Q)
deem FINISHED but cannot deal in ROUGH
at all.
Futures Markets
A simple futures market can be created con-
sisting of two goods denoted SPOT and FU-
TURES. Trading takes place over two five-
minute trading days. At the end of day 2, trad-
ers holding short (selling) positions in FU-
TURES must deliver SPOT, and traders hold-
ing long (buying) positions must take delivery
of SPOT. Traders are divided into two differ-
ent types with each type having a different
payment schedule. These payment schedules
are listed in table 1.
Each trader begins with $10,000 in cash
and 30 units of SPOT. A lower position limit
of zero in SPOT prevents short selling. Note
that the day 1 payment schedule represents a
storage charge on holding SPOT from day 1
to day 2; this can be interpreted as a per unit
storage charge of $10 and $5 for Type 1 and
Type 2 traders, respectively.’ At the end of day
2, all SPOT goods held are redeemed accord-
ing to the day 2 payment schedule. To maxi-
mize the net returns, traders would have in-
dividual demand functions of Q = 100 – P,
and Q = 50 – P for Types 1 and 2, respec-
tively.
The competitive equilibrium is easily de-
rived by determining the aggregate demand
across the two trader types and computing the
equilibrium SPOT price in each day in a two-
period storage problem with no carryover be-
yond day 2. With an equal number (n) of each
trader type, there is a total of 60n units of the
commodity. The market demand is the sum of
the demands of the two trader types:
D(P) = n(100 – P) + n(50 – F’)
= n(150 – 2P).
For the market to clear, this demand must
equal the total availability of 60rz, implying
that the day 2 equilibrium price for SPOT is
$45. At the end of day 1, all the SPOT goods
should be held by Type 2 traders, who have
lower storage costs. The day 1 equilibrium
price is $40 (the expected price in day 2 less
the storage cost of $5 for Type 2 traders),
while the equilibrium FUTURES price on both
days is $45.6
A Market with Risk and Information
The final example illustrates markets with
asymmetric information about the value of a
good. For example, farmers typically have bet-
ter information on their own potential crop
yields than they have about yields in other
farming regions. Alternatively, consider a
speculative market with informed and unin-
formed traders. In an asymmetric information
market, all participants eventually come to
know the value of goods, but the time pattern
of information resolution can have significant
impacts on the time path of prices.
For concreteness, suppose there are indi-
viduals that live in different regions, with de-
lays or imperfections in the transmission of
information among the regions. Specifically,
traders may have better information about the
demand in their own region than they have
about demand in other regions. The following
market captures some of the realities of this
situation.
Consider a single-period, single-good mar-
ket. Each trader starts with 30 WIDGETS and
$10,000. The WIDGETS can be redeemed at
the end of the period at a random per unit rate.
To determine this rate, a coin is tossed 20
times prior to the beginning of trading; each
head tossed adds $10 to the redemption value.
During the trading period, each trader re-
ceives information about the results of the
5Although it cannot be determined from the pay-
ment schedule, the SPOT good does not depreciate
from day 1 to day 2.
GThe equilibrium is independent of risk prefer-
ences because a complete market in contingent claims
exists, allowing all risk to be eliminated.Fackler and McNew: Experimental Markets Using EMP 159
tosses (messages can be sent to individual par-
ticipants with the EMP system). This infor-
mation is not revealed to the traders in the
same order, however. For example, after five
coin tosses, one participant may be told that
four heads and one tail were tossed; another
trader may be told that two heads and three
tails were tossed. Before trading ends, the re-
sults of all the tosses will be known to all the
traders and each will have common valua-
tions—equal to $10 times the total number of
heads.
The coin toss framework implies that prior
to any information revelation, all participants
have equal priors concerning the redemption
value of WZDGETS (this value is $10 times a
0/1 binomial random variable, with 20 trials
having equal probability of a O or a 1). After
revealing n outcomes of the tosses, the re-
demption value is a random variable equal to
$10 times the number of heads thus far re-
vealed plus $10 times a binomial random vari-
able with 20n trials. This setup implies that all
participants start with an expected redemption
value of $100, and that each head revealed
increases their expectations by $5 and each tail
lowers expectations by $5.
The information provided differs across
traders. It is possible, however, for participants
to glean further information from the trading
behavior of others. For example, a trader with
private information of two heads and three
tails would have an expectation of $95. If the
trader observes that other traders are willing
to buy WIDGETS for $105, a reasonable as-
sumption is that some traders know at least
three heads have been tossed. Classroom ses-
sions implementing this market reveal that stu-
dents differ considerably in how well they un-
derstand and make use of this trading behavior
tool.
Using Experimental Markets in the
Classroom
Significant educational benefits potentially can
be obtained through the use of self-contained
market simulations. Educational research sug-
gests that individuals exhibit varied learning
modes and that no one teaching style is effec-
tive for all students (Felder and Silverman).
Market simulations can be used to provide stu-
dents with a more direct experience than can
be obtained through lectures alone, and can
demonstrate the relevance of economic and
management principles. By providing a setting
in which economic concepts can be applied,
simulations can enhance students’ motivation
to learn.’ Such a setting makes use of the stu-
dents’ own competitive nature and harnesses
it for educational purposes. Because the sim-
ulation design is under the control of the in-
structor, it can be tailored to specific pedagog-
ical goals. At the most basic level, students in
the authors’ classes on agricultural markets
and futures and options markets gain an un-
derstanding of institutional details, such as the
distinction between bid and ask prices, mark-
ing-to-market, cost-of-carry, arbitrage, and de-
livery aspects of futures and options markets.
In addition, economic concepts such as the
gains from trade and efficiency can be illus-
trated.
Another use of experimental markets is in
motivating optimization principles, equilibri-
um concepts, and comparative statics. For ex-
ample, students should be able to construct
their own demand and supply functions from
either the payment schedule and/or the trans-
formation schedule that the designer assigns
them; indeed, if they are not able to do this,
it is unlikely that the experimental market will
produce predictable results. Profits in sessions
run by the authors are typically quadratic in
the amount held, so the necessary calculus for
derivation of demand functions is fairly ele-
mentary.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss
how EMP is utilized in a specific classroom
setting. For the past two years, a junior/senior-
level agricultural marketing course taught by
one of the authors at the University of Mary-
land has used EMP as an integral part of the
course content. Fourteen students participated
7Many experimental economists have emphasized
the importance of monetary rewards to enhance partic-
ipant motivation. This can be impractical in a teaching
situation, however. Making grades depend (in part) on
performance in market simulations represents a prac-
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in six different sessions throughout the semes-
ter. No teaching assistants were used for these
sessions, and the instructor had ample time
both to run the EMP session and to address
student questions. Each session emphasized
the course content by taking the fundamentals
from classroom lectures and highlighting them
in trading sessions. Comparative statics effects
were illustrated by changing the underlying
demand/supply or marketing margin condi-
tions from one day to the next. Thus, students
experienced first hand the effects of changes
in transport rates, for example, on the price
they received as a producer or paid as a con-
sumer.
The six sessions differed in content and
complexity. The first and simplest session il-
lustrated price discovery in a market with only
consumers and producers. From there, later
sessions addressed spatial markets and trade,
intertemporal markets and storage, product
form and derived demand, storage and futures
markets, and production uncertainty with fu-
tures markets.
Prior to each EMP session, students were
given information about the type of market,
the number of trading days, the length of each
day, and what their economic role would be
on each trading day. Students, while aware of
their own demand or cost structure, were un-
aware of other students’ demands or costs so
they could not infer the equilibrium price for
each day.
Each EMP session is designed to illustrate
comparative statics results. A “base” case is
used for one trading day and then other trading
days illustrate changes in the underlying cost
or demand structures to accentuate price and
quantity impacts from the base values, Stu-
dents rotate throughout the session to assure
that each serves a different economic role.
After each session, homework is assigned
requiring computation of equilibrium prices
and quantities for each trading day along with
the theoretical equilibrium profits (surpluses)
for each group. Students analyze the market
and their own trading results based on the data
generated by the EMP sessions and compare
these to the theoretical values. Not only did
this exercise reinforce the economic compar-
ative statics of the market, but it also allowed
students to tie economic surpluses to a mean-
ingful concept like trading profits.
A specific example from the spatial market
EMP session is provided below, along with
some of the results from the session.
A Spatial Market Example
The spatial market in this example EMP ses-
sion consisted of two locations: Mayberry and
Beverly Hills. Production of the commodity
occurs only in Mayberr y (the STICKS), while
consumption occurs only in Beverly Hills (the
SLZCKS ). To get the consumable good from
the STZCKS to the SLICKS, there are trans-
porters (the SHIPS ) which transform the com-
modity from Mayberry to Beverly Hills at a
cost. Only SHIPS have access to both markets.
Thus, in this market there are three distinct
roles: STICKS, SLICKS, and SHIPS.
For the base case, the STICKS have a mar-
ginal production cost of $5 for the first 10
units, increasing by $10 for each additional 10
units produced. This is accomplished through
the transformation process, where each trans-
formation has an associated cost and capacity
constraint. The capacity constraint allows for
increasing marginal cost for higher produc-
tion. The SHZPS have a constant marginal
shipping charge of $10 (i.e., perfectly elastic
supply of shipping services). Operationally,
the shipments are achieved through the trans-
formation screen by transforming the Mayber-
ry commodity (which they purchase in the
market) into the Beverly Hills commodity for
a cash fee. Their capacity constraint is set to
a very large number, giving them the ability
to ship virtually unlimited quantities for the
same cost.
For the base case, the consumers (SLICKS )
have a payment schedule of Q(1OO – 0.5Q)
which is paid to them at the end of the trading
day and is based on their holdings of the com-
modity at that time. This payment is the rev-
enue they generate. The cost of acquiring the
good is P X Q. Therefore, their profit-maxi-
mizing quantity is Q = 100 – P, which is their
individual demand curve. As the market price
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Figure 5. Transaction and theoretical equilibrium prices for spatial market
just their quantity by selling when the price
increases and buying when the price falls.
From the base case, three comparative stat-
ics results were illustrated: (a) a change in the
transport rate, (b) a demand change in Beverly
Hills (a change in the payment schedule func-
tion), and (c) a supply change in Mayberry (a
change in the cost of transformation). To allow
for trader rotation, six trading days were
used—three base days and one day for each
comparative statics case. Thus, each trader
served a specific role for two days and then
rotated to a new trader group. Each day lasted
seven minutes because two groups (STZCKS
and SHZPS) needed to make transformations
to get the product from first producer to final
consumer. When fewer groups make transfor-
mations, the day length may be shorter.
Figure 5 displays the transactions prices for
Mayberry and Beverly Hills for two days of
trading. Day 1 is the base case, while day 2 is
the case when transport costs increase from
$10 per unit to $50 per unit. These two days
corresponded to the third and fourth days of
the six-day lab session.
The equilibrium day 1 prices are $60 in
Beverly Hills and $50 in Mayberry.x Indeed,
for most of the day, prices in both locations
were quite close to these theoretical values.
This was the second replication of the base
case and, as such, trader learning led to most
of the transactions being at or near theoretical
equilibrium prices. However, in day 2, the
transport rate increased dramatically to $50
(for the first time in the lab) and traders ad-
justed slowly to this change. Initially, May-
berry (producer market) transactions took
place at roughly the same price ($50) as in day
1, but SHZPS soon learned that Beverly Hills
consumers were unwilling to pay the $100
price offered by SHZPS. Over the day, the
Mayberry price declined and approached the
theoretical equilibrium price of $25. The Bev-
erly Hills price remained above the theoretical
price of $75 for much of the day as SHZPS
had to cover their high cost of buying in the
6These are the equilibrium prices when there are
four producers, five shippers, and five consumers. At
these prices, all arbitrage opportunities for the SHIPS
have been exhausted and the equilibrium quantity pro-
duced in Mayberry equals the quantity consumed in
Beverly Hills.162 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Mayberry market. Ultimately, the prices in
each market displayed the expected change
from the base day: Mayberry (producer) prices
decreased and Beverly Hills (consumer) prices
increased as a consequence of higher trans-
portation charges.
In addition to learning about comparative
statics effects in spatial markets, this lab also
introduced the concept of price risk. SHZPS
face price risk in this market because of the
time lag between purchasing the input (May-
berry commodity) and transforming it for sale
in Beverly Hills. Although it took only about
10 to 30 seconds for the transformation to take
place, the price in Beverly Hills could de-
crease over this time and result in a loss on
the transaction. Students recognized the need
for a market in forward commitments for de-
livery to Beverly Hills, and this set the stage
for later lab sessions on futures markets.
Concluding Comments
The experimental economics framework has
proven to be valuable in testing hypotheses for
economic research. By creating self-contained
environments in which economic decisions
must be made, researchers can directly test
economic hypotheses in a controlled setting.
For demonstrating economic concepts in
classroom settings, self-contained economic
environments like those developed in experi-
mental economics have been beneficial. Al-
though some students do well with the ab-
stract, conceptual framework used in the
standard lecture format, other students find the
approach difficult. The lack of concrete ex-
periences related to course subject matter can
hamper students’ ability to grasp conceptual
material, leading to boredom or frustration.
For economic researchers or instructors,
the costs of developing and implementing
such methods can be a major constraint. We
have described here a software tool that can
significantly lower these costs and provide a
flexible and useful means for achieving spe-
cific research or pedagogical goals.
A number of examples have been given to
illustrate the sophistication and complexity of
institutional arrangements that can be designed
with this system—including the use of EMP
experiments in the classroom, especially in the
context of teaching agricultural market analy-
sis.
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